Why China is Being Urged to Study Ukraine’s Wartime PR Blitz in the AI Age

The People’s Liberation Army’s push into social media and online influencers is part of a broader effort to reshape how Beijing communicates its interests abroad. As China contemplates its own information operations, it would do well to study the wartime propaganda machine of Ukraine.

Researchers from the National University of Defence Technology argue that advanced technology alone is insufficient in today’s complex information environment. Success depends on integrating information strategy with military operations. This approach was central to Ukraine’s communications efforts during its conflict with Russia. The country’s propaganda machine played a crucial role in shaping global opinion on the war, leveraging drone strikes as a way to tell a story of Ukrainian resilience and determination.

Ukraine’s success wasn’t solely due to its messaging strategy; it also benefited from the international community’s willingness to amplify its narrative. As China contemplates its own information operations, it must consider how it will engage with – or resist – external influences on its message. The call for “multi-actor coordination” among Beijing’s various stakeholders is a crucial aspect of this strategy.

China can create a more robust and resilient information operation by integrating government, think tanks, and online influencers into a cohesive messaging effort. This approach acknowledges the reality that messaging in the digital age is inherently collaborative – even when it seems adversarial. Generative AI tools are another key component of Ukraine’s communications arsenal, but Beijing must also be mindful of the risks associated with relying on AI-fueled propaganda.

The use of AI in warfare is a relatively new phenomenon, and its implications are still being explored. China’s own experiences have been complicated, with attempts to deploy AI-powered drones in the South China Sea met with skepticism by regional observers. As Beijing navigates this complex landscape, it would do well to consider not just Ukraine’s wartime propaganda machine but also its own historical context.

For decades, China has been investing heavily in its military and technological capabilities – only to see them largely overshadowed by America’s overwhelming military might. In the information age, however, the tables may be turning. The idea that a nation can “win” or “lose” an information campaign is increasingly obsolete. Today’s complex information environment demands a more nuanced understanding of messaging and its impact on global opinion.

Ultimately, Beijing’s success in the information age will depend on its ability to engage with – or resist – external influences on its message. By studying Ukraine’s wartime propaganda machine and integrating lessons from its own experiences, China can create a more robust and resilient information operation that serves its strategic interests abroad. This requires more than just throwing money at the problem; it demands a fundamental shift in how Beijing thinks about messaging, technology, and the global information landscape.